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Abstract
In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks (LANs) under limited-
information conditions as befits a distributed system. Rather than assuming “by rule” conformance
to a protocol designed to regulate packet-flow rates (e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-
cooperative game framework and build a dynamic altruism term into the net utility. The effects of
altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium for both the ALOHA and CSMA frameworks in the quasi-
stationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either power or throughput based costs of networking, and
the cases of identical or heterogeneous (independent) users/players. In a numerical study we consider
diverse players, and we see that the effects of altruism for similar players can be beneficial in the
presence of significant congestion, but excessive altruism may lead to underuse of the channel when
demand is low.
I. INTRODUCTION
Flow and congestion control are fundamental networking problems due to the distributed,
information-limited nature of the decision making process in many popular access technologies.
Various distributed mechanisms have been implemented to cooperatively desynchronize demand,
e.g., TCP, ALOHA, CSMA. Typically, when congestion is detected, all end-devices are expected
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2to slow down their transmission rates and then increase again slowly hoping to find a fair and
efficient equilibrium1. The fact that this process is not incentive compatible (a user/player could
selfishly benefit by not following the prescribed protocol) raises two important issues.
First, the fact that users could have access to alternative implementations of the prescribed
(“by rule”) protocols, e.g., ones that slow down less than they should, could lead to an unfair
allocation or even congestion collapse (see e.g., [16], [47]). To address such threats, there is a
steadily growing literature that analyzes the equilibria of different distributed network resource
allocation games [3], [16], [20], [29]–[31], [35], [37], [38], [42], [51], [52]. The theoretical
models considered ideally would allow for more informed choices in the implementation of the
corresponding flow and congestion control protocols (e.g., by associating a utility function to
end-devices, which can then be the basis of actions by rationally selfish players).
A “fair” resource allocation may not be optimal from an economic point of view. So, a second
important challenge in the design of distributed flow and congestion control protocols is to enable
users to optimize their utility of bandwidth while simultaneously maximizing the total welfare
in the system. One simple approach is to set a pricing mechanism on resource consumption (or
account for the cost of networking) and thus allow users to express their net utility through their
willingness to pay. Otherwise, there may not be a trustworthy way for heterogeneous users that
need more to get more, thus increasing the incentives of certain users to bypass the prescribed
protocol.
For a random-access LAN, several authors have recently considered the problem of distributed
optimization of a global objective (total throughput, social welfare) subject to a fairness con-
straint. For example, in [20], a utility function design problem is studied considering estimation
errors of the network state. In a Markovian setting without fictitious play2, [38] introduces a
cooperation parameter (a probability to stop transmitting), but follows a detection and punishment
methodology regarding selfish behavior. In [23], a window-update algorithm that tries to directly
minimize the average idle time of the channel is proposed. As our main contribution, we
formulate and analyze a novel CSMA medium access control game with conditionally altruistic
players. Altruistic tactics in evolutionary/mean-field games have long been considered, see [26]
1RED [40] was intended to anticipate congestion and desynchronize TCP backoff actions.
2i.e., without steady-state estimates of certain quantities.
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3as a recent reference. For example, altruism has been modeled as a user’s statically personalized
weight on the utility of others in games of: network formation [8], packet forwarding in delay
tolerant networks [27], routing [10], and medium access control by us in [33]. See also [18],
[19], [24] for examples assuming a fixed set of altruism parameters that characterize each user
or pair of users.
In the following, we consider a fictitious play model where altruism by one user is based on
perceived mean throughput of the other players modulated (i.e., made “dynamic”) by factoring
the estimated mean total channel idle time [23]. Large idle time may be a signal that competing
devices are also behaving in a socially sensitive manner, expressing the current “social norm,”
or it could simply reflect low traffic demand. So, we model the altruistic motivations of a user in
a simpler framework of heterogeneous users in which the user will employ less than her “fair”
share when she doesn’t really need it, but under the constraint that others do the same. The
resulting equilibria that such altruistic devices could reach are studied in terms of stability and
under assumptions of asynchronous/multi-rate user/players. Finally, we do not assume that the
users share information and act in a coordinated fashion, i.e., so as to form a player coalition.
Note that our system with heterogeneous users will respond similarly to a selfish user with low
throughput demand and a more altruistic one with high throughput demand. Moreover, excessive
altruism will simply result in an underused channel. To address this, a possible improvement
would be to include a measure on the expected congestion levels based on the number of users
sharing the same channel and to limit the altruism factor in end-user utilities so that channel
underuse does not result. We leave these issues, as well as applications to other MAC scenarios
not considered here, to future work.
This paper is outlined as follows. In Section II, we give a brief background on altruistic
behavior. A fictitious-play model with dynamic altruism for a slotted-ALOHA LAN is given
in Section III. In Section IV, variations of the LAN model are considered. Numerical studies
are given in Sections V and VI, the latter considers player diversity. A discussion of TCP flow
control and congestion avoidance, in the context of player altruism, is given in Section VII.
Finally, in Section VIII, we conclude with a summary and discussion of future work.
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4II. BACKGROUND ON ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR
Economists are often criticized for the common assumption that humans are “rational” (i.e., purely
self-interested), which leads to a pessimistic view of the outcome of various formulated game-
theoretic models. In reality, many people act “altruistically”, defined as an “unselfish concern
for or devotion to the welfare of others” [5]. In fact, despite this selfishness stereotype for
economics, certain branches, such as behavioral economics and experimental economics, do
incorporate social, cognitive, and psychological factors in their models of human behavior (see
[17] for a historical overview), in a way not typically captured in cooperative game-theoretic
frameworks. Especially since the early 1980s, there is a very rich and constantly growing
literature on experimental economics, whose ambitious objective is to devise (in particular,
rational) economic models that express accurately the expected altruistic behavior of humans
in certain settings through the analysis of experimental data, e.g., [34], [36].
Two common scenarios in which altruistic behavior consistently appears is in ultimatum
bargaining and public-good contribution games. Ultimatum bargaining reveals the altruistic
instincts of humans in a resource-sharing problem in which one player decides how to share a
fixed amount of money and the other decides whether to accept or reject sharing: here rejection
leaves both with zero profit. Experiments show that people altruistically sacrifice their own profit
to punish unfair’ decisions by others. Analysis of more traditional public-good experiments,
where players determine their individual contribution toward the construction of a pure public
good, similarly challenges the assumption that free riding is always the dominant strategy.
Of course, it is well accepted that many factors can affect human behavior, from the nature
of the game itself to small details of the experiment implementation. Nevertheless, there are
numerous interesting building blocks of human motivation that have been identified in the process
and can help us build more realistic economic models. For example, Andreoni [7] shows that
there are two different fundamental ways to capture altruism in a utility model based on whether
the source of “irrational” satisfaction is the utility of the other users (satisfaction from the benefit
of others), or one’s own contribution (satisfaction from being good).
An important lesson of experimental economics is that altruism does not seem to be a static
and hardwired characteristic of humans but depends on many aspects of the environment. In other
words, the level of altruism of an individual is dynamic and could change over time depending
November 1, 2018 DRAFT
5on the context and the behavior of the group. Indeed, the cooperation rate in many experiments
has been proven to be much higher if subjects know that there is a possibility of meeting the
same partners again in future periods [21], when their perception on the overall level of altruism
in their group is high [14], or even just by a positive framing of the experiment [6].
From these and many other contextual factors that can affect the cooperation levels in a group,
social norms is perhaps the most influential (see [13], [45]) but complex to incorporate in a simple
economic model. To this end, Fehr and Schmidt [22] have proposed an utility function explaining
the altruistic behavior of people in ultimatum experiments, which incorporates a measure of
fairness (or “inequity aversion”) in a static way, i.e., its main parameters are indifferent to the
dynamics of the system. As a more realistic but less tractable alternative, H. Margolis argues in
favor of a more dynamic and complex model, called “neither selfish nor exploited” [39], which
proposes a dual utility model which takes into account the history of one’s actions, the current
overall behavior, the effect of altruistic action, and the developed norms in a society.
In our scenario, the high complexity of human nature and the surrounding social environment
plays a less important role since the cooperation game that we study is limited in time, the
identity of the players are hidden, the stakes are relatively low, and the decisions of users are
mediated through a programmed device. So, in our model of the following section we incorporate
in a simple utility function the effect of the external manifestation of altruistic behavior, that
is a statistical norm as termed in [39], or simply “what others do” [14]. To perceive this, the
availability of reliable information about the group’s statistical behavior is critical. Our use of
the mean idle time per active player to determine the level of altruism in the system is realistic in
terms of information availability since it can be easily measured by the different users, though,
again, low demand could be mistakenly taken for altruistic behavior and vice versa, cf. Section
VIII.
When altruism can bring future concrete benefits, one could also see altruistic behavior as a
long-term net utility optimization. A characteristic example is the notion of direct and indirect
reciprocity and the related work in evolutionary game theory that tries to explain the source of
cooperative behavior in nature [9], [44]. We leave to future work the study of such evolutionary
extensions of the LAN systems we formulate below, again cf. Section VIII.
Finally, some networking mechanisms presume cooperation “by rule” to affect communal
benefit, such as flow and congestion control. Notwithstanding a tendency to altruism in the
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6typical user, these mechanisms may be easily exploited by unpoliced, greedy individuals, cf. the
discussion of Section VII.
III. SLOTTED-ALOHA RANDOM-ACCESS LAN WITH DYNAMIC ALTRUISM
A. Altruistic framework for with power based cost and concave utility of throughput
Consider a slotted ALOHA random-access LAN wherein the N ≥ 2 participating nodes
control their access probability parameter, q. A basic assumption is that nodes’ control actions
are based on observations in steady-state, i.e., “fictitious play” [15], resulting in a quasi-stationary
dynamical system [28], [29], [51] based on the mean throughputs:
γi(q) = qi
∏
j 6=i
(1− qj).
Another basic assumption in the following is that the source of a successful transmission is
evident to all other participating nodes. We further assume that the degree of altruism αi of each
node i depends on the activity of the other users as:
αi(q−i) =
∏
j 6=i
(1− qj) =
γi(q)
qi
= γi(q) +
∏
j
(1− qj),
where the second term is just the mean idle time of the channel; thus, every node can easily
estimate its (dynamic) altruism. By using its control action (strategy), qi, each i seeks to maximize
its net utility:
Vi(q) = Ci log(γi(q)) + Aiαi(q−i)γ−i(q)−Miqi (1)
where: the dynamic altruism factor α modulates the contribution of the mean service of all other
players to the net utility of player i,
γ−i(q) =
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
γj(q); (2)
the utility derived by one’s own throughput is modulated by a concave function [28]–[30] as
modeled here in the form of a logarithm (for tractability); and we have assumed a power based
cost3 Mq. Note that because we assume that the source of each successfully transmitted packet is
3Power based costs are borne whether or not the transmission is successful.
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7evident to all nodes, each node i can easily estimate γ−i. Again, though each player i optimizes
Vi in a non-cooperative fashion, the game is called altruistic to reflect the second term in (1).
A single-play slotted ALOHA game between two identical players is similar to the game
chicken. If ξ < 1 is the cost of transmission and the (normalized) payoff of successful transmis-
sion is 1, then the following table gives net payoffs for collective action (transmit (Tx) or not)
by the players (P1,P2):
HHHHHHHHH
P2
P1
Tx no Tx
Tx (−ξ,−ξ) (0, 1− ξ)
no Tx (1− ξ, 0) (0, 0)
The single-play game has three Nash equilibria: two “pure” strategies, (Tx,no-Tx) and (no-
Tx,Tx), and one mixed strategy: Tx with probability q∗ (and don’t Tx with probability 1− q∗),
where q∗ = 1 − ξ jointly minimizes the expected net gains, (1 − ξ)qk(1 − q3−k) − ξqkq3−k, of
players k ∈ {1, 2}.
In the following, we consider an iterated version of this game where players pursue mixed
strategies based on observations of throughput γi observed in steady-state. Note that if we further
assume that nodes are aware of the C,M parameters of other nodes, then we can replace γ with
the net utility of the other players as in [33] (particularly for throughput based costs Mγ).
Proposition 3.1: If the game is synchronous-play and all users i have the same (normalized)
parameters
c := Ci/Mi < 1 and a := Ai/Mi,
then there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium q∗ = q∗1, where 0 < q∗ < 1 is a solution to
f(q) := aq2(1− q)2N−3 + q − c = 0. (3)
Proof: When qi = q for all i, the first-order necessary conditions of a symmetric Nash
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8equilibrium,
0 =
∂Vi
∂qi
(q1) = − M
q
f(q),
i.e., equivalent to (3). Note that f(0) = −c < 0 and f(1) = 1− c > 0, the latter by hypothesis.
So, by the continuity of f and the intermediate value theorem, a root of f exists in (0, 1).
All such solutions q∗1 correspond to Nash equilibria because ∂2Vi(q)/∂q2i = −Ci/q2i < 0 for
all i, q.
The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 3.1: There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium point (NEP) if minq∈(0,1) f ′(q) >
0 (i.e., f is strictly increasing), a condition on parameters N and a.
Note that there may be non-symmetric Nash equilibria in these games, even for the case of
homogeneous users, e.g., [32]. Also, it is well known that Nash equilibria of iterative games are
not necessarily asymptotically stable, e.g., [2], [49], [53]. In [28], [29] for a slotted-ALOHA
game with throughput based costs Mγ, using a Lyapunov function for arbitrary N ≥ 2 players,
a non-cooperative two-player ALOHA was shown to have two different interior4 Nash equilibria
only one of which was locally asymptotically stable (see also [41]).
For stability analysis of our altruistic game, consider the discrete-time (n), synchronous-play
gradient-ascent dynamics,
qi(n) = argmax
qi
Vi(qi; q−i(n− 1)) ∀i. (4)
In a distributed system5, the corresponding continuous-time Jacobi iteration approximation is:
q˙i(t) =
∂Vi
∂qi
(q(t)) ∀i, (5)
and is motivated when players take small steps toward their currently optimal response, i.e., better-
response dynamics [50]. That is, for positive step-size ε 1 (5) approximates the discrete-time
4i.e., not including the stable boundary deadlock equilibrium at q = 1.
5cf. Section IV-C for a discussion of asynchronous play.
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9better-response dynamics,
qi(n) = qi(n− 1) + ε∂Vi
∂qi
(q(n)) ∀i, (6)
which is a kind of distributed gradient ascent. The Jacobi iteration is also motivated by the desire
to take small steps to avoid regions of attraction of undesirable boundary NEPs, particularly those
corresponding to the capture strategy (qi = 1 for some i). Note that when more than one player
selects this strategy, the result is a bad outcome for the game chicken or a deadlocked “tragedy
of the commons.” Additionally the players avoid the opt-out strategy (qi = 0 for some i). In
summary, (6) represents a repeated game in which players adjust their transmission parameters
qi to (locally) maximize their net utility Vi.
To find conditions on the parameters of net utilities (1) for local stability of the equilibria, we
can apply the Hartman-Grobman theorem [46] to (5), i.e., check that the Jacobian is negative
definite. The following proposition uses the conditions of [48] for stability (and uniqueness) for
a special case.
Proposition 3.2: In the case where players have the same parameters C and A, the symmet-
ric NEP q∗1 is locally asymptotically stable under the dynamics in (5) when the normalized
parameters satisfy
C > 2(N − 1)A. (7)
Proof: By [48], the result follows if the symmetric N ×N matrix H(q) is negative definite,
where
Hij =
∂2Vi
∂qi∂qj
+
∂2Vj
∂qj∂qi
.
First note that, for all i,
Hii(q) = −C
q2i
< − C.
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For l 6= i,
∂2Vi
∂qi∂ql
=
∂
∂ql
(
C
qi
− Aα(q−i) 1N−1
∑
j 6=i
qj
∏
k 6=i,j
(1− qk)
)
= A
∏
j 6=i,l
(1− qj) 1N−1
∑
j 6=i
qj
∏
k 6=i,j
(1− qk)
+ Aα(q−i)
1
N−1
(∑
j 6=i,l
qj
∏
k 6=i,j,l
(1− qk)
−
∏
k 6=i,l
(1− qk)
)
.
Now because 0 < qi < 1 for all i and the triangle inequality,
|Hij(q)| ≤ 2A ∀j 6= i.
So, by the Gershgorin circle (disc) theorem (see p. 344 of [25]), all of H(q)’s eigenvalues are
less than −C + (N − 1)2A. So, if (7) holds, then all the eigenvalues of H(q) are negative, and
so H(q) is negative definite.
B. The marginal effect of altruism
In this section, we will write q∗ (of the symmetric NEP q∗1 in symmetric users case) as a
function of the normalized altruism parameter a := A/M , q∗(a). Note that q∗(0) = c := C/M .
Recall that the total throughput for slotted ALOHA, Nc(1−c)N−1, is maximal when c = 1/N .
The maximum total throughput is (1−1/N)N−1 ≈ e−1 for large N , i.e., the maximum throughput
per player is 1/(Ne) in this cooperative setting without networking costs.
So, if c > 1/N , i.e., total throughput is less than e−1 because of excessive demand (overloaded
system), then a marginal increase in altruism from zero (0 < a  1) will cause a marginal
decrease in q∗ ↓ 1/N , resulting in an increase in throughput per user γ ↑ 1/(Ne). Also, if
c < 1/N , i.e., total throughput is less than e−1 because of a lack of demand (an underloaded
system), then a marginal increase in altruism from zero will again cause a marginal decrease in
q∗, but here resulting in a decrease in throughput γ (further away from the optimum e−1). See
Section V-D below.
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IV. MODEL VARIATIONS
In this section, we discuss model variations, which we subsequently analyze. An analytically
straightforward variation is to simply use (N−1)γ (i.e., just mean total channel idle-time), instead
of γ given by (2), thus not requiring an estimate of the the number of active users, N . However,
the mean idle-time per active user γ better captures the current levels of altruistic behavior in
the system and is more consistent with ideas of inequity aversion [22]. So we will not explore
this simple variation further here as, again, we are herein neither interested in maximizing social
welfare nor related “efficiency” issues captured by a global criterion (accommodating users with
very different magnitudes of demand in a typically additive way); rather, we are interested in the
effect of altruism on distributed, non-cooperative network-access games. More ambitious model
variations than those discussed in this section are mentioned in the concluding Section VIII.
Note how our model of altruism leads to neither selflessness nor full cooperation, but is
closer to a (rationally) selfish model, i.e., again as H. Margolis characterized it, neither selfish
nor exploited [39]. Also in our model, altruism needs to accommodate the limited and potentially
unreliable information of a distributed network.
A. Throughput based costs
In [33] we considered throughput based costs with a static altruism parameter and with utility
proportional to throughput. Instead of (1), for throughput based costs with dynamic altruism and
utility being a concave (log) function of throughput, we can model the net utility as:
V˜i(q) = Ci log(γi(q)) + Aiαi(q−i)γ−i(q)−Miγi(q). (8)
Proposition 3.1 can easily be adapted for power based costs. Instead of (3), the first-order
necessary condition for a symmetric Nash equilibrium q1 under throughput based cost is
f˜(q) := aq2(1− q)2N−3 + q(1− q)N−1 − c = 0. (9)
All solutions q for (9) correspond to NEPs q1 because ∂2V˜i(q)/∂q2i = −Ci/q2i < 0 for all i, q
(as for power based cost). Note that f˜(0) = f˜(1) = −c < 0, so we cannot simply use the
intermediate value theorem as we did for Proposition 3.1 to establish existence of a symmetric
Nash equilibrium when c < 1. Here, existence requires
max
0<q<1
f˜(q) ≥ 0, (10)
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a condition on N, c, a. Note that if the inequality in (10) strictly holds then there will be an even
number of symmetric NEPs, again by the intermediate value theorem. If the maximum equals
zero then there may be a unique symmetric NEP.
B. Proportional throughput utility
Suppose that utility is simply proportional to throughput and cost is power based, i.e., the net
utility is
Vˆi(q) = Ciγi(q) + Aiαi(q−i)γ−i(q)−Miqi. (11)
Note that the net utility Vˆi is linear in qi (this would also be the case if throughput based costs
were involved). This normally leads to candidate “bang-bang” Nash equilibrium play-actions,
qi ∈ {0, 1} for all players i; i.e., the players are either out of the game (qi = 0 if ∂Vˆi/∂qi < 0)
or are all in (qi = 1 if ∂Vˆi/∂qi > 0). Note that the latter play action, potentially leading to
the deadlock of “tragedy of the commons”, is not an equilibrium here because if qj = 1 then
∂Vˆi/∂qi = −M < 0 for all i 6= j.
It turns out that for this case, there is a symmetric interior equilibrium q1 for the identical
players case with 0 < q < 1, i.e., where
fˆ(q) := ∂Vˆi
∂qi
(q1)
= c(1− q)N−1 − aq(1− q)2N−3 − 1 = 0. (12)
If c > 1, fˆ(0) = c − 1 > 0 and fˆ(1) = −1 < 0 and so there is a solution to fˆ(q) = 0 for
0 < q < 1 by the intermediate value theorem. It should be noted, however, that such an interior
Nash equilibrium q1 is not stable, i.e., it’s a saddle point in the domain [0, 1]N .
C. Asynchronous/Multirate Players
Asynchronous players were considered previously in [30] using the ideas from [11], [12].
A very similar approach can be used to extend the results herein to account for the effects of
asynchronous play. Numerical results for this case are given in Section VI-B below.
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V. NUMERICAL STUDIES FOR IDENTICAL PLAYERS AT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
A. Power based costs
For normalized utility parameter c = 0.5 and normalized altruism parameter a = 1, Figure
1(a) is a plot of f in (3); i.e., for power based costs, for N = 2, 3, 5, 10 players. The root at
q = 0.4 corresponds to N = 2 (i.e., corresponding to NEP q1) and, as the first term of f becomes
negligible, the root at ≈ 0.5 corresponds to the N > 2 cases. For c = 0.5 and N = 5, Figure
1(b) is a plot of f for a = 0.1, 1, 10, 100. Note that a = 100 corresponds to the larger curve
which has a the smaller root q, i.e., under “excessive” altruism the NEP q → 0.
(a) Ranging N
(b) Ranging a
Fig. 1. Power based costs
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B. Throughput based costs
Using the same parameter cases as those for power based costs, Figure 2(a) is a plot of f˜ in (9)
for c = 0.5, a = 1 and N = 2, 3, 5, 10. Figure 2(b) is a plot of f˜ in (9) again for c = 0.5, N = 5
and a = 0.1, 1, 10, 100. The larger curve, corresponding to a = 100, has two zero-crossings q
at approximately 0.1 and 0.4, i.e., has two different symmetric NEPs q1. The other parameter
sets do not possess an interior NEP, a situation which will be remedied if we reduce the utility
c from 0.5 to zero; that is, increasing f˜ .
(a) Ranging N
(b) Ranging a
Fig. 2. Throughput based costs
C. Throughput-proportional utilities and costs
Figure 3(a) is a plot of fˆ in (12) for c = 2, a = 1 and N = 2, 3, 5, 10. Figure 3(b) is a plot
of fˆ for c = 2, N = 5 and a = 0.1, 1, 10, 100. Following intuition, the lower curves (and lower
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roots, NEPs) correspond to larger N (larger congestion leading to lower throughput) or larger
a (greater altruism again leading to lower throughput), in a monotonic fashion when all other
parameters fixed.
(a) Ranging N
(b) Ranging a
Fig. 3. Throughput proportional utility and cost
D. An example comparing altruism and non-cooperation
In this section, we compare the Nash equilibria under altruistic player action with equilibria in
purely non-cooperative scenarios. For all scenarios, we considered the case of power based costs,
log-utility of throughput, normalized utility parameter c = 0.5, and identical users. For the purely
non-cooperative scenario, i.e., a = 0, the symmetric Nash equilibrium q = c = 0.5 is simply
obtained by solving (3). For the scenarios with altruism, the normalized altruism parameter was
taken to be a = 20. Recall that for static altruism, α ≡ 1. At Nash equilibrium q∗ = q∗1, the
November 1, 2018 DRAFT
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throughput (γ∗ = q∗(1− q∗)N−1) and utility (1) performance per user is given in the following
table, in decreasing order of throughput.
Scenario N q∗ γ∗ V ∗/M
Dynamic Altruism 4 .22 .1044 -0.36
Static Altruism 4 .16 .0935 0.53
Non-cooperative 4 .50 .0625 -1.89
Static Altruism 8 .28 .0277 -1.52
Dynamic Altruism 8 .50 .0039 -3.27
Non-cooperative 8 .50 .0039 -3.27
Note that for N = 8, the altruistic component of utility at Nash equilibrium is negligible,
when comparing dynamic altruism versus non-cooperation, owing to high contention under the
assumed parameters when there are eight users. We see that the non-cooperative scenario has
poorest throughput performance in the above examples. However, if the level of altruism is too
high, under either the static or dynamics mechanisms, the channel may be underused; in this
case, the altruism parameters could be adjusted via an “evolutionary” process to avoid channel
underuse.
VI. NUMERICAL STUDIES WITH PLAYER DIVERSITY
A. Players with different altruism parameters
Consider the game with power based costs. In this section, we consider players with different
normalized altruism parameters a for N = 3 otherwise identical players with normalized param-
eter c = 0.5 associated with power-based cost. Specifically, the first player has a1 ranging from
30 to 70, while the other two players both have a = 50. Note that changing a in this manner
will result in changes in the NEP q∗ and corresponding throughputs γ∗ (and utilities V ∗ per user,
as shown in the following table):
a1 q
∗
1, q
∗
2 = q
∗
3 γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 = γ
∗
3 V
∗
1 , V
∗
2 = V
∗
3
30 0.15, 0.10 0.13, 0.074 0.754, 2.37
40 0.12, 0.10 0.10, 0.080 1.40, 2.24
50 0.10, 0.10 0.083, 0.083 2.10, 2.10
60 0.091, 0.11 0.073, 0.087 2.79, 1.83
70 0.079, 0.11 0.063, 0.090 3.56, 1.82
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Clearly, increased altruism, a1 > 50, by player 1 resulted in lower throughput for him and higher
throughput for the other two players. Similarly, decreased altruism by player 1, a1 < 50, resulted
in higher throughput for him and lower throughput for the other players.
B. Sizes of regions of attractions under different play-rates
In this section, we study how the volume of the regions of attractions of different equilibria
are sensitive to players adopting different play-rates, while retaining our assumption of ficti-
tious/quasistationary play. Consider the case of N = 3 players two of whom have the same play
rate while the other adopts a play rate that is a multiple, r, of the other two. We consider the
case of throughput based costs as in Figure 2(b). That is,
q˙
i
(t) = ri
∂V˜i
∂qi
(q(t)) ∀i, (13)
where ri = r for player i = 1, otherwise ri = 1 and V˜ is given in Section IV-A. Numerically
simulating (13) from different initial points chosen from a grid in the hypercube [0, 1]3, we
counted the number of initial points converging to a given NEP so as to estimate the volume
of its region of attraction. Note that the introduction of such play-rate parameters ri does not
change the position of the NEPs. Using normalized parameters a = 50 and c = 0.5, the function
f˜ whose roots are the NEPs is depicted in Figure 4. As can be seen from the following table,
the region of attraction is very sensitive to r in the range 0.1 to 10.
Volume NEP = (0.1)1 NEP = (0.75)1
r = 0.1 0.502 0.498
r = 0.25 0.507 0.493
r = 1 0.556 0.444
r = 4 0.839 0.161
r = 10 0.841 0.159
The results are intuitive: a lower r effectively corresponds to a reluctance to be altruistic and
thereby results in a smaller domain of attraction for the more altruistic Pareto equilibrium (0.1)1
(corresponding to throughputs of γ = 0.081 and utilities V = 1.94, respectively compared to
γ = 0.047 and V = −1.43 corresponding to (0.75)1).
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Fig. 4. Power based costs with N = 3, a = 50 and c = 0.5
VII. DISCUSSION: END-TO-END TCP FLOW AND CONGESTION CONTROL
Interesting game theoretic models for end-to-end window flow control (as in TCP), based
on internal bandwidth bottlenecks6 have been extensively studied, see, e.g., [1], [43], including
modifying backoff parameters. Player diversity depends in part on differences in round-trip
times (RTTs) which correspond to responsiveness – players with smallest RTT to a congested
bottleneck who follow traditional distributed TCP congestion control will be the most altruistic
in that they will back-off first. The equilibrium is a “water-filling” where the player with largest
RTT and demand D1 receives d1 = min{D1, C}, where C is the bottleneck capacity. The player
with second largest RTT and demand D2 receives d2 = min{D2,max{C−D1, 0}}, and similarly
d3 = min{D3,max{C −D1 −D2, 0}}, etc.
Players can reduce the level of their altruism by artificially delaying their response to con-
gestion (i.e., beyond the minimal response time governed by their RTT), in the limit being
completely nonresponsive to congestion. Though such manipulation may be more straightforward
for end-users or individual applications compared to modifying congestion backoff in layer-2
MAC protocols, a difficulty here is that there may be little knowledge about the behavior of
other players (in this highly distributed setting) to form the basis of altruistic action; indeed, it
is likely that many players/sessions are only minimally responsive to congestion, e.g., streaming
media over UDP running RTCP and p2p file-sharing using utorrent clients.
6Typically with associated memory to buffer packets in times of congestion.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we extended a non-cooperative game framework for information-limited MAC
of a LAN by adding an altruism term that depended on both the mean throughput of the other
players and the mean channel idle time. The cases of heterogeneous or homogeneous users,
and of power or throughput based costs, were considered for a quasi-stationary model of the
game. A numerical study compares the per-user throughput under dynamic and static altruism
with that of purely non-cooperative dynamics, and demonstrates the advantage of altruism under
moderate levels of congestion (number of players) in the homogeneous-player setting, and for a
heterogeneous user scenario.
In the future, we plan to depart from ideal quasi-stationary dynamics and consider the effects
of measurement error (as in [20], [41]), leading to a more “stochastic” version of the games
considered here. We also plan to extend our study of dynamic altruism to the simple power-
control based medium access considered in [33] for static altruism.
Finally, we will consider an evolutionary “wrapper” about the dynamics considered here or
other factors affecting the parameters of the net utilities (1), e.g., the desire to avoid under-
utilization of the channel or to account for multiple-priority transmission. Indeed, motivated
by the prospects of significant reward, defections by a few individual players may cause an
evolutionary/slow-cycle of transitions between full cooperation (limited by information avail-
ability and associated costs), to complete non-cooperation, via “intermediate” altruistic behavior
[44]. So, the altruism considered herein may, in principle, be rationally motivated based on
long-term reward considerations.
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